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A B S T R A C T
While empirical studies on technological innovation systems (TIS) usually focus on policy instruments and their
suitability for curing identiﬁed weaknesses of such emerging systems, the underlying policy processes and their
eﬀects have been largely disregarded. We address this gap by exploring the style of two crucial policy-making
processes and how it inﬂuences the functioning and performance of a TIS, taking the case of oﬀshore wind in
Germany. Our ﬁndings indicate important positive and negative impacts of the policy style on the TIS. For
example, the muddling through character apparent in one of the policy processes negatively inﬂuenced
entrepreneurial activities, knowledge development and ﬁnally technology diﬀusion, whereas the participatory
nature of both processes had a positive impact both on TIS functioning and performance. Based on our ﬁndings
we derive implications on how to improve policy making so as to foster the development of an emerging TIS.
1. Introduction
Analyses of technological innovation systems (TIS) focus on emer-
ging technologies often in early phases of development (e.g. [32]).
Typical for these early stages is the existence of a number of failures
hindering the development and diﬀusion of the young technologies, so
that it is particularly hard for them to compete with established
technologies [10]. For overcoming these failures and allowing the
technologies to become market-ready, government intervention is
needed [38,8].
Against this background, the goal of TIS studies is to identify such
failures or systemic problems and, based on this, suggest concrete tools
for policy intervention, so as to purposefully foster the technology [33].
There exists a considerable number of studies having completed exactly
such analyses. One of the ﬁrst studies of this kind is Negro et al. [46]
that analyzes the functional patterns of the biomass TIS in the
Netherlands identifying corresponding system failures and suggesting
policy measures for addressing them. Further studies that examine
systemic problems via a functional analysis of TIS and identify areas for
policy intervention include, for example, Jacobsson and Karltorp [34],
van Alphen et al. [62], and Jacobsson [31]. While the analytical
framework applied in these studies has helped policy makers by
analyzing where policy intervention is needed and has suggested policy
instruments, studies have focused much less on associated policy
processes.
In this regard, recent studies identiﬁed a need for a better
conceptual understanding of institutions in TIS, including the regula-
tory frame [61] and tools for the selection of policies that address
system failures [13]. Related to that, the literature called for a more
detailed understanding of the dynamics of policy intervention pro-
cesses that result from addressing systemic problems [28]. These
studies hint at the importance of more thoroughly examining policies
in TIS, particularly policy processes. It is therefore the goal of this
paper to address this gap by analyzing policy-making processes that
respond to systemic problems and exploring how these processes
inﬂuence TIS functioning and TIS performance in terms of technology
use and diﬀusion [26,4]. In particular, we focus on the style of these
policy-making processes – or policy style in short – as the policy style
has been argued to be an important determinant for eco-innovation
[35], and analyze the role of this style for the TIS. This focus on the role
of the policy style allows for revealing vital information about the
nature and impact of such policy processes, which in turn enables us to
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derive concrete policy recommendations for how to improve policy
making so as to foster the development of an emerging TIS.
For our analysis we frame policy processes as part of a compre-
hensive policy mix concept [53]. It is these processes that shape the
elements of the policy mix – that is the policy strategy and various
instruments. Thereby the processes can have an indirect impact on
innovation. However, it has been argued that policy processes may also
directly inﬂuence innovation, yet with few empirical studies investigat-
ing this link.
We address this gap in the literature by examining the role of policy
processes for technological innovation systems, taking the case of
oﬀshore wind in Germany. The main reason for choosing this case is
that the German oﬀshore wind TIS has experienced several systemic
problems that were addressed by policy makers, ultimately contribut-
ing to the evolution of a complex policy mix as well as to some positive
developments in terms of TIS functioning and performance [50,51].
Methodologically, we combine expert interviews and desktop research
to analyze the policy-making processes in which two crucial systemic
problems were addressed. These problems posed the greatest barriers
in the TIS in recent years and were thus decisive for the further
direction of the TIS. In doing so, we shed light on the direct and
indirect mechanisms by which the style of these processes impacted
TIS functioning and TIS performance.
In the following we will ﬁrst review the literature on technological
innovation systems and policy processes, with a focus on policy-making
processes and their relevance for TIS functioning and performance
(Section 2). We then provide a brief overview of the research case
(Section 3), and a delineation of our methodological approach (Section
4). Subsequently we describe the policy-making processes as well as the
associated policy-making style and analyze the eﬀects on the TIS
(Section 5). Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2. Technological innovation systems and policy processes
The technological innovation systems (TIS) approach has been
widely applied to the analysis of emerging technologies, among others
in the ﬁeld of energy technologies [3,33,61]. The major goal of these
studies is to detect system strengths and weaknesses by analyzing the
structure and functions of the TIS. While structural analyses of TIS
focus on describing its actors, networks and institutions and thus
constitute static inquiries [15], functional analyses map a range of
diﬀerent activities taking place in the TIS. For doing so a number of key
functions are applied ([26], see Table 1). This functional analysis serves
as prerequisite for explaining the performance of TIS in terms of the
development and diﬀusion of innovations [26,4]. Based on the
identiﬁed system strengths and problems, concrete recommendations
for government intervention are given so as to improve system
functioning. In doing so, studies often suggest which policy instru-
ments might best be suited to remove the systemic problems [46,65].
In terms of policy, TIS studies have so far focused on policy
instruments and their role for innovation systems. That is, some
studies show how policy instruments impact innovation systems
[37,44], while other studies state which policy instruments may be
eﬀective in improving TIS performance [45,62]. Another aspect TIS
studies consider with regard to policies is system building, such as how
actors shape the build up of innovation systems and their institutions,
including policies [39,40].
However, policy processes have as yet been largely neglected in TIS
studies [13,27], although their importance for innovation has recently
been stressed, e.g. in the policy mix literature. For instance, Flanagan
et al. [24] in their call for a reconceptualization of the policy mix for
innovation point out that policy processes should be an integral part of
policy analyses. Rogge and Reichardt [53] acknowledge the importance
of policy processes in their policy mix concept, based on their potential
inﬂuence on policy mix eﬀectiveness, for instance regarding innova-
tion.
The study by Chung [12] on technology and innovation policies in
Taiwan is one of the ﬁrst and very few ones to focus on the analysis of
policy processes in an innovation system context. It analyzes the link
between the innovation policy-making process, the design of innova-
tion policy instruments and the development of the innovation system,
ﬁnding vital dependencies between these factors. However, what is still
lacking is an analysis of the direct impact of policy processes on the
innovation system.
In order to address this gap an important starting point is to clarify
what is meant by policy processes, given the multitude of deﬁnitions
that have been used [29]. Due to our focus on policy in the context of
innovation we rely on Rogge and Reichardt [53, p. 1625] who, in their
policy mix concept for innovation, deﬁne them as “political problem-
solving process among constrained social actors in the search for
solutions to societal problems”. Besides the crucial role of actors, this
deﬁnition stresses an important aspect for this study, namely the fact
that policy processes aim at solving (societal) problems.
Policy processes with their plethora of diverse actors with hetero-
Table 1
Key functions of technological innovation systems.
Source: adapted from [66].
Function (function number) Description
Experimentation and production by entrepreneurs
(F1)
Entrepreneurs are essential for a well-functioning innovation system. Their role is to turn the potential of new knowledge,
networks, and markets into concrete actions to generate – and take advantage of – new business opportunities.
Knowledge development (F2) Mechanisms of learning are at the heart of any innovation process, where knowledge is a fundamental resource. Therefore,
knowledge development is a crucial part of innovation systems.
Knowledge exchange (F3) The exchange of relevant knowledge between actors in the system is essential to foster learning-processes.
Guidance of the search (F4) The processes that lead to a clear development goal for the new technology based on technological expectations, articulated
user demand and societal discourse enable selection, which guides the distribution of resources.
Market formation (F5) This function refers to the creation of a market for the new technology. In early phases of developments this can be a small
niche market but later on a larger market is required to facilitate cost reductions and incentives for entrepreneurs to move
in.
Resource mobilization (F6) The financial, human and physical resources are necessary basic inputs for all activities in the innovation system. Without
these resources, other processes are hampered.
Creation of legitimacy (F7) Innovation is by definition uncertain. A certain level of legitimacy is required for actors to commit to the new technology
and execute investments, take adoption decisions etc.
K. Reichardt et al. Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 80 (2017) 1217–1226
1218
geneous interests and often long time horizons are usually extremely
complex [55]. In order to analyze and better understand such complex
processes diﬀerent theories on the policy process have been developed
that explain how these processes shape policy outcomes [55]. However,
the objective of this study is not to explain how or why certain policy
outcomes, such as policy instruments, or changes in these, come about
by policy processes but to study the role of such processes for the
technological innovation system. We therefore need an analytical
concept for capturing these policy processes, which then enables us
to analyze their impact on the TIS. For this purpose the concept of
policy style – ﬁrst introduced by Richardson [52] – seems appropriate
since it captures the nature of policy processes, i.e. the “operating
procedures for making and implementing policies” [52].
In his seminal work Richardson [52] proposes describing national
policy processes by contrasting anticipatory versus reactive and con-
sensus-oriented versus impositional policy styles. More recent studies
have built on this generic policy style typology, analyzing policy styles,
often of particular countries, and describing them in terms of, e.g., the
degree of consensus in policy formulation, the role of expert advice or
the extent to which policy making occurs unilaterally in a top-down
manner [5,60,9]. In this paper we build upon and extend Richardson's
generic typology of policy style by drawing on three approaches
reﬂecting policy styles that can often be found in real-world policy
processes and that seem to be particularly relevant in the context of
emerging TIS: the science of muddling through, adaptive policy
making, and participatory policy making. In combining these, we rely
on a more diﬀerentiated typology serving as our analytical concept to
describe the style of policy processes..
The ﬁrst approach is Lindblom's [41,42] science of muddling
through or incrementalism, which purports that rational-comprehen-
sive decision-making is hindered by constraints in intellectual and
informational capacities as well as time and resources. Rather, when
changing existing policy instruments administrators compare a limited
number of similar alternative instruments and thus design policy in an
endless process of incremental but easily reversible steps. Policy
making in this manner is assumed to bring about only incremental
changes compared with the status quo. Lindblom argues that a
continuous sequence of incremental steps nonetheless might lead to
faster policy-induced changes than any comprehensive policy-making
approach. More recent studies evaluated Lindblom's approach in the
light of scientiﬁc advances since it has been developed, concluding that
in parts it does no longer hold to a globalized, networked and rather
conﬂictual policy-making world, which can be described by more far-
going models of the policy process with greater explanatory power. Yet
its basic idea of incremental steps in policy making still applies today
[1,48].
The second approach considered, which is in part related to the idea
of incrementalism, is adaptive policy making [64]. It assumes that
policy instruments are usually designed for a certain future scenario
and that in fact often another scenario occurs, so that the original
instruments do not ﬁt any more. Therefore, it is argued that policy
instruments should not be tailored to a particular scenario of the future
but should be able to adapt to changing circumstances. Such policy
instruments should consist of components with the potential to shape
the future and components that preserve the needed ﬂexibility. That is,
policy instruments should make explicit provision for learning and
respond to changes over time. They should also leverage the self-
organizing potential of all kinds of actors and the decentralization of
governance to detect emerging policy issues and design the needed
adaptations in policy instruments [43,59]. Overall such adaptive
policy-making processes are likely to be more eﬀective than rational
processes aiming for ‘optimal’ designs, since they can adjust to speciﬁc
situations [2].
Finally, the third approach is that of participatory policy making,
which has been conceived as the degree of involvement of diverse
stakeholders with their stakes and values in policy processes [25,58].
This stakeholder involvement is deemed to be necessary particularly in
the context of sustainability transitions – such as the German energy
transition, for which the emerging oﬀshore wind technology is playing
a role – since a plethora of actors are needed for such a transition to be
accomplished. Involving them in policy processes might also contribute
to maintaining social equity and cohesion [25]. Participatory policy
processes are likely to lead to policy instruments with designs better
tailored to the particularities of target actors and which are thus more
accepted by aﬀected actors.
Based on these three approaches, which extend Richardson's
seminal typology, the nature of policy-making processes can be
described in terms of muddling through (which we also refer to as
incrementalism), adaptiveness and participatory policy making.
Analytically, we are interested in shedding light on how the policy-
making style – captured by these three categories – inﬂuences the
functioning and performance of a technological innovation system.
Here, by functioning we refer to the seven TIS functions elaborated by
Hekkert et al. [26] while by performance we mean technology use and
diﬀusion. By analyzing this link between policy-making style and TIS
we take an important step towards incorporating policy processes as
part of a broader policy mix in TIS analysis.
3. Research case
For our analysis we selected two policy processes in the German
oﬀshore wind TIS. In the following we explain why we chose this
research case.
Regarding the TIS in focus, we chose the German oﬀshore wind TIS
for three major reasons. First there are ambitious targets in place for
oﬀshore wind in Germany, i.e. 6.5 GW of installed capacity by 2020
and 15 GW by 2030 [11], but the TIS still displays a poor performance
with only 0.52 GW installed at the end of 2013 [22]. This might be due
both to the comparative immaturity of the technology with related high
costs [23], and to the existence of systemic problems in the TIS.
Second, an encompassing policy mix has been set up, implying that
policy makers may somehow have attempted to address these pro-
blems. Third, oﬀshore wind is a technology with great technological
potential and growth prospects, and could thus play an important role
in a decarbonization of the energy sector, not only in Germany but also
globally (e.g. [21]). This technological potential results from the strong
and steady winds at sea and correspondingly many full-load hours
(4000 compared to 2000–2500 onshore) as well as the technology's
large scale and associated great project sizes [20]. Against this back-
ground, Germany is an interesting case since it is one of the fastest
growing oﬀshore wind markets worldwide [49], despite its currently
relatively low installed capacity.
Regarding the chosen policy processes addressing systemic pro-
blems, out of ﬁve identiﬁed systemic problems [50] we selected those
two that posed the greatest barriers in the TIS in recent years and
whose resolution essentially contributed to the further development of
the TIS. These problems are, ﬁrst, an insuﬃcient level of support of the
feed-in tariﬀ for oﬀshore wind in the mid 2000s and second, heavy
delays in grid access provision for parks between about 2010 and 2012.
The existence of the ﬁrst problem can be traced back to the mismatch
between the foreseen EEG feed-in tariﬀs for oﬀshore wind and actual
cost developments and is therefore closely linked to the Renewable
Energy Act (EEG). The second problem was mainly caused by the
ineﬀectiveness of the grid access regulation for oﬀshore wind parks
speciﬁed in the Energy Economy Law (EnWG) and evidenced by delays
in grid access to be provided by TSO TenneT. Since these two policy
instruments were decisive for the existence of the systemic problems,
we will shortly introduce them.
The Renewable Energy Act (EEG) has been put in place in the year
2000 with the goal to signiﬁcantly increase the share of renewable
energy technologies in Germany. For achieving this, it introduced –
among others – technology-speciﬁc feed-in tariﬀs with a twenty year
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guaranteed payment per produced kilowatt-hour of electricity [16].
While in the initial EEG there was only one feed-in tariﬀ (FIT) for
onshore and oﬀshore wind, the ﬁrst oﬀshore wind-speciﬁc FIT was
introduced with the 2004 EEG amendment, since higher costs were
expected for oﬀshore than for onshore plants. This oﬀshore wind FIT
was increased – according to updated cost estimations – several times
in the course of the years, besides in 2004 also in 2009 and 2012
[17,18].
The grid access for parks was originally regulated in the EEG,
according to which park operators were to ﬁnance the grid connection
themselves [16]. This provision was changed with the Infrastructure
Planning Acceleration Act (InfrStrPlBeschlG) in 2006, becoming part
of the Energy Economy Law (EnWG). It shifted the responsibility of
connecting oﬀshore wind parks to the grid from the park operators to
the transmission system operators (TSOs) and prescribed that this
connection had to be available when a farm was ready to start
operation [30]. Due to several emerging problems, this grid access
regulation had to be changed again, with a fundamental ‘system
change’ occurring in 2012 (see Section 5.1.2). An essential provision
of this new system is that the operators are to negotiate a date with the
TSO at which the grid access would be provided. If the TSO cannot
adhere to this date, it is to ﬁnancially compensate the operator for the
standstill. In addition, TSOs are to put up a yearly oﬀshore grid
development plan detailing the location, timing and size of new grid
connection cables [19].
4. Methodology
To investigate policy-making processes addressing systemic pro-
blems and how they inﬂuence TIS, we chose a qualitative approach.
This allows, ﬁrst, for a detailed analysis of these processes and their
style, such as how certain decisions were taken and executed, and for
an in-depth investigation of the processes’ impacts on the TIS. Second,
such an exploratory approach is particularly suited for areas of research
that have not yet been systematically studied, which is the case for the
relevance of the style of policy processes for TIS [67]. Our methodo-
logical approach therefore is based on expert interviews and supple-
mented by desktop research providing secondary data for triangulating
our interview ﬁndings.
For our expert interviews we selected stakeholders who – either in
person or via their organization – played a crucial role in the respective
policy-making process. This enabled us to get detailed ‘insider’
information on these processes and on the role they played for the
TIS. We interviewed two groups of stakeholders: The ﬁrst group were
experts that were themselves deeply involved in the policy-making
processes. Second, we interrogated various other actors who were
involved in or knowledgeable about the systemic problems, so as to
obtain a detailed understanding of the problems and their contexts. In
total we conducted ﬁfteen interviews with experts in the TIS under
study, including representatives of the government, public organiza-
tions, the transmission system operator, industry associations and
NGOs (see Table 2).1 Interviews took place between July 2013 and
January 2014 and on average lasted about eighty-four minutes. All
interviews relied on a semi-structured interview guide and were
conducted by telephone. We transcribed and coded the interviews with
codes for each of the two systemic problems, the policy-making
processes, and diﬀerent actors. In order to safeguard the interviewees’
anonymity, throughout this text we reference them with letters from A
to N, which were randomly assigned to the interviewees.
In addition, we complemented our interview data with secondary
data. For this, we screened relevant documents related to the policy-
making processes and their underlying systemic problems. These
documents included position papers by industry associations, press
releases by involved actors such as the environment department and
draft versions of the two legislations.
Building on the insights from the coded interviews and from the
documents, we reconstructed the policy processes addressing the two
selected systemic problems by identifying common themes from our
data. This enabled us to thoroughly understand these systemic
problems and to describe at a suﬃcient level of detail the style of the
policy processes that occurred to address them. Finally, this data
analysis allowed for identifying patterns of the processes’ impacts on
the functioning and performance of the TIS.
5. Policy processes and their eﬀects on the German oﬀshore
wind TIS
In this section we present our ﬁndings in three steps: we ﬁrst
describe the two selected policy processes, starting with their under-
lying systemic problems (Section 5.1) and subsequently analyze their
style (Section 5.2), and ﬁnally we examine their eﬀects on the TIS
(Section 5.3).
5.1. Description of the policy processes
5.1.1. The policy process addressing the problem of insuﬃcient level
of support of the 2004 oﬀshore wind feed-in tariﬀ
5.1.1.1. Systemic problem. The adjustment of the oﬀshore wind FIT
in the 2009 EEG amendment was the consequence of a severe systemic
problem, which developed and increased after launching the ﬁrst
technology-speciﬁc FIT in 2004. At the time of its introduction as
part of the 2004 EEG amendment, this FIT appeared to be adequate
given the state of knowledge and most projects being still relatively far
from their realization (Interviewee M). Also, a Danish project planner
ensured to be able to immediately start construction with such a FIT, as
this interviewee recalls: ‘if we ﬁxed the oﬀshore wind feed-in tariﬀ like
we then actually did in the law, […] then they [Danish project planner]
could make the decision tomorrow to start construction’ (Interviewee
Table 2
Overview of expert interviews.
Actor type Organization # interviews
Government Federal Environment Ministry (BMU) 3
Federal Maritime and Hydrographic Agency (BSH) 2
Federal Network Agency (BNetzA) 1
Public organizations Reconstruction Loan Corporation (KfW) 2
Center for Wind Energy Research (ForWind) 1
Transmission system operator (TSO) TenneT 1
Industry associations Offshore Wind Foundation 1
German Engineering Association (VDMA) 2
Wind Energy Agency (wab) 1
Non-governmental organization World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) 1
SUM 15
1 This data collection was embedded in a larger analysis of the German oﬀshore wind
TIS (see [50]).
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M). Nonetheless, soon after the FIT's enactment project planners
realized that its level of support would probably not be cost-covering
and called for its increase (Interviewees E, K). In particular, during the
planning and realization process of Alpha Ventus it became clear that
this FIT level was actually too low since project realization costs turned
out to be considerably higher than expected (Interviewee L). Although
the responsible policy makers from the Federal Environment Ministry
(BMU) well knew about the problem they did not change the FIT before
the next EEG amendment in 2008. Therefore in the years between
approximately 2006 and 2008, this low FIT was a major reason why
relatively well developed oﬀshore wind projects were not started. This
considerably delayed the further development of the German oﬀshore
wind TIS and therefore constituted an important systemic problem. In
the following we zoom into the policy processes that addressed this
problem and that led to the oﬀshore wind FIT adjustment in the 2009
EEG amendment.
5.1.1.2. The policy process addressing the systemic problem. Although
many stakeholders, e.g. industry lobby groups, had called for a higher FIT
soon after the 2004 EEG amendment, the oﬀshore wind FIT was not
adjusted until 2009: the German government did not even want to make
small changes within the EEG, fearing that in such a case all diﬀerent
technology interest groups also wanted their FIT or other EEG regulation
adjusted (Interviewee M). Waiting with such an adjustment had thus been
a political decision. It had to do with the relatively formalized overall EEG
amendment processes, in which the EEG is regularly adjusted as package
for all technologies it covers. Each amendment is usually preceded by a
so-called experience report on the functioning of the current EEG. This
report is required by law every three to four years (see §65 EEG) and is to
be done by the government. In fact it is drafted by the environment
ministry mainly based on scientiﬁc studies that evaluate the eﬀectiveness
of the current EEG. After parliament has noticed the report and the
government has released it, the environment ministry elaborates an EEG
amendment draft, which again needs to be enacted by the government
and is then fed into the parliamentary process to be adopted. While the
experience report is mandatory by law, the EEG amendments are not. Yet
due to stakeholder pressure –mainly by industry associations such as the
German Engineering Association (VDMA) – to ﬁx the aspects that needed
improvement according to the experience report, and probably also to
improve the situation for their constituency, policy makers have so far
always amended the EEG following such a report (Interviewee M).
In the particular amendment process for the 2009 EEG, the
environment ministry elaborated the regular experience report in
2007, whose oﬀshore wind part was mainly based on studies that the
ministry in 2005 had contracted to the operator consortium of the
demonstration project Alpha Ventus, the German Oﬀshore Test Field
and Infrastructure Society (DOTI), and to the Deutsche Windguard, a
German consultancy for wind energy. Already in the process of
developing the experience report, industry associations tried to take
inﬂuence. However, they were excluded from the oﬃcial drafting of this
report (Interviewee M). Instead the environment ministry (BMU) and
the Federal Ministry of Economics (BMWi) closely collaborated when
elaborating the report, discussing it “sentence by sentence”
(Interviewee M) during about six to eight months. The report was
released by the federal cabinet in November 2007, and given to
parliament for notice. It proposed to raise the initial oﬀshore wind
FIT – at that time 9.1 ct / kWh for twelve years – to a level ranging
between 11 and 15 ct / kWh and after twelve years that a plant had
received this FIT lower it to 3.5 ct / kWh [6]. Independent from the
experience report, interest groups had also posed their claims for a new
FIT. Most prominently, the Oﬀshore Wind Foundation in June 2007
had published a statement on how to alter the FIT, demanding a raise
of the initial remuneration to 14 ct / kWh and after twelve years a
lowering to 6.19 ct / kWh [47].
As is usually the case, after release of the 2007 EEG experience
report the political pressure to amend the EEG rose. Thus, the
environment ministry in 2007/8 worked out an amendment to the
EEG suggesting an increase of the oﬀshore wind FIT corresponding to
the range proposed in the report [7]. Following the formalized policy
process, this amendment draft was again discussed with the involved
ministries, i.e. the environment and economics ministries and the
Federal Ministry of Finance (BMF), as well as with the federal
chancellery during several months before it was enacted by the federal
cabinet and sent to parliament. The FIT in this parliamentary version
from February 2008 was set to 12 ct / kWh for the ﬁrst twelve years
with an additional 2 ct / kWh for projects starting operation before
2014 [14]. This FIT level is exactly within the range proposed in the
ﬁrst EEG draft [7].
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Fig. 1. Policy process adjusting the oﬀshore wind FIT in the 2009 EEG amendment.
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As a next step, the responsible parliamentary committee dealt with
the EEG draft, before it went back to be ﬁnally discussed within the
coalition parties (CDU, SPD) and the three involved ministries
(environment, economics, ﬁnance). These last negotiations were ‘an
emotional discussion in which all involved actors wanted to bargain the
best deals for their clientele’ (Interviewee M). Regarding oﬀshore wind,
pro-oﬀshore government members were able to increase the FIT by one
additional cent compared to earlier propositions, achieving 13 ct / kWh
(plus a “sprinter bonus” of 2 ct / kWh). Fig. 1 illustrates this process,
with the systemic problem as starting point, the moments of problem
identiﬁcation by project planners and policy makers, and an indication
of the period of inaction by the latter actor group. It further depicts the
stepwise changes in the FIT and ends with the altered policy mix
element, i.e. the EEG amendment with the ﬁnal level of support
granted by the adjusted oﬀshore wind FIT.
In sum the policy process leading to the 2009 EEG amendment was
a rather lengthy process (almost ﬁve years) with interaction particu-
larly between diﬀerent government actors, and with industry groups
trying to inﬂuence the FIT according to their interests. Within these
frequent interactions the level of the proposed oﬀshore wind FIT
changed several times – over several political rounds it was increased
step by step, with the highest level being ﬁnally adopted.
5.1.2. The policy process addressing the problem of delayed grid
accesses after 2009
5.1.2.1. Systemic problem. The grid access regulation from 2006 left
undeﬁned which park should be connected in which order by the
transmission system operators (TSOs), which is why the TSO TenneT –
in charge of grid connections in the German North Sea – put up a list of
criteria the projects had to fulﬁll in order for the TSO to become active
(Interviewee H). These criteria on the one hand made the situation
clearer, but on the other hand led to a new problem for project
planners, known as the chicken-egg-problem. It referred to the mutual
dependence of the grid access and ﬁnance commitments – each one
was only possible to be attained against production of the other one
(Interviewees H, J). The Federal Network Agency (BNetzA), in charge
of implementing the grid access policy instruments, addressed the
problem in a position paper in 2009, in which it clariﬁed the criteria
that project planners were to deliver so that the TSO had to start
constructing the grid connection (Interviewee J). This facilitated a ﬁrst
wave of investment decisions for around three GW of installed capacity
that were, besides this position paper, mainly triggered by the then
increased FIT for oﬀshore wind (Interviewee J).
However, this improved grid access situation did not last long.
When planning and implementing cables for this ﬁrst wave of parks,
TenneT began to encounter a number of problems (Interviewees J, L;
[56]). First, technical diﬃculties occurred, e.g. with converter stations
for which TenneT's suppliers were responsible. Second, crossing the
Wadden Sea National Park implied conﬂicts with nature protection and
thus was accompanied by high administrative requirements TenneT
had to fulﬁll. Third, TenneT experienced ﬁnancial bottlenecks as well as
shortages with human resources. These problems were the reason why
the whole process of cable planning and realization by TenneT took
much longer than anticipated and in most cases was not ﬁnished when
the oﬀshore wind farm was ready to start operation. As a consequence,
oﬀshore wind projects were delayed causing high costs for the
planners, which risked to render their projects ineﬃcient. This also
meant that the future of the oﬀshore wind TIS remained highly
uncertain [63]. This problem, which can be said to have its roots both
in inappropriate regulatory provisions (originally in the
InfrStrPlBeschlG from 2006, which did not suﬃciently clarify grid
access criteria for parks) and in bottlenecks with TenneT, constituted at
that time the most severe systemic problem. As a consequence, in 2011
and partly in 2012 many TIS developments were put on hold
(Interviewees I, J), despite the just recently resolved problem of an
insuﬃcient FIT level. In other words, solving one important systemic
problem was not enough to get the TIS development going again since
another systemic problem had come up. This situation can be described
as inconsistency between the EEG and the grid access regulation, in
which the latter policy instrument hindered the working of the former
one.
5.1.2.2. The policy process addressing the systemic problem. The
above described grid access problem was not adequately addressed by
the responsible economics ministry (BMWi) and over time became so
severe that it escalated in an urgent letter (a so-called “Brandbrief”) to
the government by the TSO TenneT in November 2011. In this letter
TenneT argued it would be no longer able to connect oﬀshore wind
farms to the grid under the current circumstances, and asked for
political help. Being forced to react due to TenneT's inaction and thus a
standstill of projects waiting for grid access, the economics ministry –
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Fig. 2. Policy process leading to the 2012 EnWG amendment.
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together with the environment ministry – took a decisive step
convening a high-level meeting with the ministers in charge, Rösler
and Röttgen (Interviewees H, J). They discussed possibilities for
solving the grid access problem with the result that both ministries
set up a working group with all aﬀected actors, the so-called working
group ‘Acceleration’ (‘AG Beschleunigung’)2 (Interviewee J). The
reason for addressing the problem in such a working group was to
come up with a joint solution to which all relevant stakeholders agreed.
The Oﬀshore Wind Foundation constituted a central actor in this
process since it volunteered to moderate the group (Interviewees E, L).
Under the moderation of the Foundation, this working group met
several times discussing possible improvements for preventing such
delays in the future and working out concrete suggestions. Involved
actors described the atmosphere in the group as very cooperative with
much support from all sides, since actors were interested in a timely
solution to this then pressing problem. Moreover the discussions were
characterized as a joint dialogue aiming to address diﬀerent interests
(Interviewees H, J). Probably due to this strong joint aim of ﬁnding an
appropriate solution, the working group in only eight weeks elaborated
a proposition for improving the grid access regulation, which the
Oﬀshore Wind Foundation formulated into a policy paper by March
2012 [57].
In this paper the Foundation made detailed and concrete sugges-
tions for a system change in grid access, which industry representatives
had long been calling for (Interviewee E). The responsible ministries
took this paper as basis for changing the grid access regulation,
adopting most of its suggestions and partly further developing some
of them, and feeding the proposal into the formal political process. This
process resulted in an amendment of the EnWG in December 2012,
which was very positively absorbed by aﬀected actors despite some
remaining uncertainties regarding its eﬀectiveness. Fig. 2 depicts this
amendment process with the systemic problem and its escalation, the
identiﬁcation of the problem by policy makers and the main steps in
the policy process that ﬁnally ended in an amendment of the Energy
Economy Law (EnWG).
In sum, the policy process addressing the problem of delayed grid
access is characterized by relatively long inaction (three years) and
inadequate action despite problem awareness, but comparatively quick
– about one year's time – concerted action subsequent to problem
escalation. Next to the Oﬀshore Wind Foundation as central actor,
aﬀected industry stakeholders were mainly involved in developing this
solution – with the responsible economics ministry and the environ-
ment ministry accompanying the process.
5.2. Style of the policy processes
The style of the EEG amendment process greatly resembles the
adaptive policy process approach: policy makers set a certain FIT level,
monitor and evaluate its eﬀects, and subsequently adjust it to better ﬁt
actual developments [43,64]. The particular 2009 oﬀshore wind FIT
adjustment process occurred within the formalized, regular and thus
foreseeable overall EEG amendment process. Yet policy action was not
ﬂexible enough in a dynamically changing TIS: although the problem of
the FIT's too low level of support was long known, policy makers stuck
to the foreseen EEG amendment process and therefore only reacted
after this problem had already prevented several oﬀshore wind devel-
opments. Furthermore, the process was participatory in a rather formal
way, i.e. by incorporating stakeholders in the amendment process via
oﬃcial hearings and consultations. Thus, the EEG amendment process
can be described as a formal, government-led process that was open for
input from stakeholders. As the outcome suggests, particularly industry
associations were quite successful in exerting inﬂuence, for which an
important reason may have been the potential contribution of oﬀshore
wind to the achievement of climate, renewable energy and industry
policy objectives (evidenced also in the UK by Kern et al. [36]).
Somewhat diﬀerently, the policy process that addressed the grid
access delay problem shows parallels to Lindblom's [42] ‘muddling
through’ approach since policy makers from the economics ministry
were preoccupied with remedying a huge problem rather than proac-
tively seeking positive goals, such as much earlier establishing a well-
functioning grid access regulation. Concerted reaction to this problem
was tardily reactive: it occurred with great delays – only when it had
escalated and nothing worked any more – and in an ad-hoc fashion.
This tardy reactiveness might partly be explained with constraints in
time and resources. Yet, once taken up the political process of
identifying a solution to the problem was particularly participatory
and cooperative, with an important reason probably being the high
pressure to alleviate the situation. All aﬀected stakeholders were
involved in a working group and they jointly worked out a solution.
Therefore, this solution-oriented process equally involved non-policy
makers and policy makers, with the latter ones by and large adopting
the outcome of this participatory process when designing the new grid
access regulation.
In sum, a commonality of the style of the studied policy processes is
that they both can be characterized as participatory. Yet while the EEG
amendment process involved stakeholders in a formal way, the EnWG
amendment process in a later phase featured particularly proactive
stakeholder involvement (see Table 3). Furthermore, while the EEG
amendment process was adaptive (albeit to a limited extent), the
EnWG amendment process with its ad-hoc character and tardy
reactiveness very much resembled muddling through. In the following
section we will discuss the implications of these processes for the
technological innovation system.
5.3. Eﬀects of the policy processes on the TIS
5.3.1. Eﬀects on TIS functioning
For the examination of the eﬀects of the style of policy processes on
TIS functions we consider two important aspects: First, such eﬀects on
TIS functions tend to occur in combination with other factors, such as
policy instruments or policy mix characteristics. Second, this interac-
tion of the style of policy processes and other factors aﬀects entrepre-
neurs by making them more cautious or more enthusiastic regarding
innovative activities. Through such chains of eﬀects and feedback loops
within the TIS, policy processes can have negative or positive impacts
on several – rather than single – system functions.
Therefore, rather than presenting a simple model of cause and
eﬀect, we will discuss some general patterns of how the policy
processes were impacting TIS functioning (see Table 4). One is the
participatory style of both policy processes and the related actor
inﬂuence in these processes. This participation contributed to in-
creased trust by actors in the political commitment towards oﬀshore
wind and reconﬁrmed expectations in the creation of supportive policy
instruments. These eﬀects then positively contributed to several TIS
functions, especially to entrepreneurial activities (F1) and knowledge
development (F2) (Interviewees A, H, J). The tight actor contact in the
Table 3
Style of the studied policy processes ‘EEG’ and ‘EnWG’.
EEG EnWG
Muddling through (tardy reactiveness) ✓
Adaptiveness ✓
Stakeholder participation ✓ ✓
2 These actors were: the environment (BMU), economics (BMWi) and ﬁnance
ministries (BMF), the network agency (BNetzA), the Federal Maritime and
Hydrographic Agency (BSH), the two aﬀected TSOs and their suppliers (Siemens, ABB,
Alstom), planners, operators, investors, the German Engineering Association (VDMA)
representing technology providers, and other associations.
K. Reichardt et al. Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 80 (2017) 1217–1226
1223
working group of the EnWG process paired with the severity of the
problem motivating actors to strive for a quick solution also positively
inﬂuenced TIS functioning (Interviewees H, J). However, overall these
positive implications appear to have been overcompensated by negative
eﬀects arising from the other more detrimental policy style aspects,
notably the tardy reactiveness in the EnWG process and negative
aspects of the adaptiveness of the EEG process, which will be explained
in the following.
A second pattern concerns the tardy reactiveness of the EnWG
amendment process, i.e. the long time until (concerted) action was
taken to address the problem, and the overarching muddling through
character of this process, which had – even in combination with more
positive factors such as the participatory style –negative eﬀects. It
increased uncertainties among entrepreneurs regarding the outcomes
of the systemic problems. This in turn had negative implications for
TIS functions, particularly for entrepreneurial activities (F1) and
knowledge development (F2) (Interviewee L).
A third pattern is associated with the adaptiveness of the EEG
amendment process, which, by the fact that the EEG is adapted to
changed circumstances from time to time, might have contributed to
higher planning certainty. Yet the particular nature of this adaptiveness
only to a limited extent contributed to such higher planning certainty
for entrepreneurs – rather to the contrary: First, uncertainties
remained due to tough debates on the contents and design features
of the amendments and corresponding feed-in tariﬀs, which had long
left open the outcome of these debates. Second, the relatively short
amendment cycles paired with inconsistencies in the instrument mix
increased uncertainties, since they implied very short periods in which
particular contents and design features were actually applicable [51].
These uncertainties about investment conditions negatively aﬀected
system functions, among them entrepreneurial activities (F1) in the
form of started oﬀshore wind projects (Interviewees H, J).
In addition to these three patterns we ﬁnd that the overall
uncertainty inherent in any policy process seemed to be particularly
high in the studied processes due to their muddling through character
and their adaptiveness. This observed policy making style appears to
have strongly inﬂuenced the function guidance of the search (F4). For
example, the long time of inaction in the EnWG amendment process
signaled a lack of guidance, since the grid access problem was not
addressed timely and systematically but rather sporadically. When
concerted political action was ﬁnally taken, i.e. the EnWG amendment
process initiated, this positively contributed to the guidance function as
it was interpreted as a signal of the still existing political will to support
oﬀshore wind (Interviewees A, J).
5.3.2. Eﬀects on TIS performance
As is the case for the impact of the policy processes on TIS
functions, their impact on TIS performance does not correspond to a
simple model of cause and eﬀect. Therefore, we focus our discussion on
three main patterns, which emerged from the data. First, the question
arises whether the perceived muddling through character of the policy
process addressing the grid access issue, where only incremental steps
were taken towards problem solution, or problems were ﬁxed only
when they became unbearable, has been disadvantageous for TIS
development. On the one hand, ad hoc action was at some point the
only alternative to solve the urgent problem, which, however, would
certainly not have been the case if the economics ministry had taken
earlier concerted action. Even more, a certain degree of incrementalism
or muddling through may generally be unavoidable due to incomplete
foresight regarding eﬀects of policy measures [54] or of technological
or other innovation system developments. On the other hand we argue
that a more systemic and forward-looking but also proactive perspec-
tive would have been beneﬁcial in the overall grid access policy process
since it may have prevented the grid access delay problem from
escalating [51].
Second, in both examples policy makers reacted with considerable
delays to the systemic problems (tardy reactiveness), which negatively
aﬀected technology diﬀusion. That is, having been bound to the
formalized EEG amendment process caused delays: oﬀshore wind
might have taken oﬀ earlier if policy makers had not been restrained
by fears of opening the whole EEG – which treats all renewable energy
technologies in one package – for adjusting it for one technology only,
but instead had reacted immediately. Also, the belated concerted action
when addressing the grid access problem signiﬁcantly contributed to
delays in oﬀshore wind projects, thereby increasing project costs and
delaying technology diﬀusion [51].
A third eﬀect is the positive inﬂuence of the participatory nature of
the two policy processes on TIS development, i.e. on investors’
activities in oﬀshore wind and thus on the use and diﬀusion of the
technology. This inﬂuence largely occurred via strengthened guidance
of the search in the form of trust, credibility and positive expectations.
It is thus another example of how policy processes may impact
innovation without explicitly changing the policy mix elements such
as speciﬁc policy instruments [53].
6. Conclusion
Our analysis of policy processes in TIS suggests that such processes
impact the functioning and performance of emerging TIS. However,
this inﬂuence does not occur in isolation but rather through the
interaction of policy processes with other factors. We identify two sets
of emerging patterns of how the style of the analyzed policy processes
impacted the TIS: First, regarding system functioning we ﬁnd negative
implications of the muddling through character (especially the tardy
reactiveness), rather positive implications of the participatory nature of
the policy processes and rather negative eﬀects of the formalized
adaptive style of the EEG amendment process. Thereby entrepreneurial
activities (F1) and knowledge development (F2) appeared as particu-
Table 4
Main effects of the style of the EEG and EnWG amendment processes on TIS functions (F1-F7).
Stakeholder participation (EEG, EnWG) Muddling through (EnWG) Uncertainties in adaptiveness (EEG)
F1 (entrepreneurial activities) + – –
F2 (knowledge development) + – –
F3 (knowledge exchange) +
F4 (guidance of the search) + –
F5 (market formation)
F6 (resource mobilization) – –
F7 (creation of legitimacy) +
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larly aﬀected functions. Second, with respect to TIS performance the
incremental ad hoc style of the EnWG amendment process was at some
point vital for a further successful TIS development and may generally
be – at least to some extent – unavoidable given inherent uncertainties
in emerging TIS, which call for frequent policy mix adjustments. Yet a
more systemic perspective would have been beneﬁcial. Furthermore,
the tardy reactiveness in concerted policy reaction had a rather
negative inﬂuence and stakeholder participation a rather positive one
on TIS performance.
In addition to their impacts on TIS functioning and performance,
further aspects justify an increased consideration of policy processes in
TIS analyses. First, a focus on policy processes sheds light on how
policy makers interact with the rest of the innovation system. For
instance, for the studied policy processes policy makers were closely
involved in what occurred in the innovation system. Nonetheless
problems were addressed with considerable delays, having negative
implications for the functioning and performance of the system.
Second and as a consequence of the former point, analyzing policy
processes elucidates how well an innovation system is organized in
terms of its institutions, i.e. how well speciﬁc problems can be brought
to the surface, how seriously these problems are taken by policy makers
and how policy makers ﬁnally deal with these problems. For example,
the two studied policy processes reveal that the underlying problems
were long known by most actors and that they were actively debated,
indicating a good ability of the TIS to put problems on the political
agenda. Yet policy makers – particularly from the economics ministry –
long did not seriously enough address these problems. When they
ﬁnally took concerted action, they dealt with the problems in a
cooperative and rather constructive fashion. That is, although the
interaction between policy makers and the remaining TIS can be
assessed as good and the discussion culture as open and cooperative,
delays in (concerted) reactions to problems are an aspect of mal-
functioning of the TIS.
Our ﬁndings entail two key implications for TIS scholars. First,
understanding policy processes in TIS reveals important additional
information on how the TIS functions. By analyzing how systemic
problems are being addressed by policy makers the existing scheme of
analysis for TIS is taken one step further than studying TIS functions
and proposing adjustments in the instrument mix. Second, while the
feasibility of implementing policy recommendations has often been
disregarded in TIS studies, accounting for policy processes will allow
for supplementary recommendations on a suitable policy-making style.
For example, recommendations on the introduction of a novel policy
instrument for grid access should be accompanied by guidance on how
the processes for the set up, monitoring, evaluation and amendment of
the instrument should be designed in terms of their style.
Building on our ﬁndings we derive three main implications for
policy makers interested in promoting emerging technologies. First, an
implication from the negative eﬀects of tardy reactiveness of the policy
processes is that systemic problems should be addressed faster and in a
more pro-active manner, thereby striving for eﬀective solutions early
on. Such solutions might sometimes only be possible when they tackle
the problem in an encompassing and systemic manner. While this
might prevent these problems from escalating, for political reasons
such problem solving may not always be feasible. Second, a precondi-
tion for such faster reactions to problems seems to be a regular
monitoring of the appropriateness of existing policy instruments
regarding actual TIS developments, which was lacking in the EnWG
amendment process. Such an adaptive policy style might be prescribed
in the regulation of the policy instrument. However, as evidenced in the
EEG amendment process, adaptiveness alone is by no means a
guarantee for preventing problem escalations but might help acceler-
ating problem awareness by policy makers. Third, the set up of a
temporary technology-speciﬁc expert task force could speed up policy
processes and increase policy acceptance. This might be particularly
useful for jointly addressing systemic problems and ﬁnding compro-
mise solutions.
Clearly, our exploratory analysis of two exemplary policy processes
within the technological innovation system of oﬀshore wind in
Germany is not free from limitations, and thus points to future
research needs. Future TIS studies should consider policy processes
and their implications more systematically, e.g. by zooming into
‘institutions’ or by labeling policy issues as ‘policy mix issues’, thereby
indicating the consideration of both policy mix elements and processes.
Regarding the latter, studies should not only analyze processes
responding to systemic problems but, for instance, also those occurring
in a proactive fashion. Finally, greater attention should be paid to
politics and actor positions and how they inﬂuence policy processes
and their outcomes.
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